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3.1  Introduction and Motivation 
The recent legislation that raised the minimum wage was accompanied by 
the Small Business Job Protection Act of  1996, which, among other things, 
temporarily (for years 1997-99)  suspends the 15 percent excise tax on “excess 
distributions” from qualified pension plans. Surely few people know about the 
excise tax in the first place, let alone its suspension. In fact, while people are 
keenly aware that pensions  allow them  to save before-tax  dollars  and com- 
pound their investment returns without current taxation, it is our impression 
that very few people know how pension assets are taxed on withdrawal or on 
the death of the owner of the pension. In this paper we present a comprehensive 
examination of the taxation of pensions, with particular emphasis on large pen- 
sion accumulations. The analysis answers a number of questions: (1) How do 
the excess distribution excise tax and its companion excess accumulation ex- 
cise tax work? How do these taxes interact with the personal income tax sys- 
tems and the estate tax? (2)  Should only high-income individuals be concerned 
about these taxes or might they be imposed on people with relatively modest 
incomes? (3) Are pension plans still attractive saving vehicles once these ex- 
cise taxes are applicable? For example, should someone whose base pension 
plan is likely to trigger either the excess distribution tax or the excess accumu- 
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Table 3.1  Average and Marginal Tax Rates Faced on a $1.9 Million Estate 
(in 1996 dollars) 
Marginal Combined  Marginal Combined 
Average Combined  Estate and Excise Tax  Estate. Excise, and Income 
Date of  Estate and Excise  Rate on Supplemental  Tax Rate on Supplemental 
Death  Tax Rate (%)  Plan (%)  Plan (%) 
1982  4.17 
1984  28.31 
1988  22.62 









lation tax participate in a supplemental 401(k) plan? (4) Are pensions equally 
advantageous for stock investments and bond investments? If not, which assets 
should be held inside a pension plan and which should be held outside the 
plan? (5) Does it always make sense to delay distributions from pension plans 
as long as possible, thereby maximizing the tax deferral advantage that they 
offer? (6) How are pension accumulations  treated when  they  are part of  an 
estate? We focus on these microeconomic issues without discussing the social 
desirability of current tax policy. However, we should acknowledge at the out- 
set that we see little economic merit in a penalty excise tax applying to people 
who save “too much” through the pension system. Most observers of the U.S. 
economy agree that the country’s saving rate is too low. Since we know that 
savers only capture a fraction of the social return  on their investments, it is 
unclear why the biggest savers in the economy should be penalized. 
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 is just the latest in a series 
of bills over the past 15 years that has changed the way pensions are taxed. To 
illustrate how radically the rules have changed, consider four different individ- 
uals with exactly the same wealth (and composition of wealth) at the time of 
their deaths, each of whom died at age 70. The four cases differ only in the 
date of death. The estates, all valued  at $1.9 million  in  1996 dollars, were 
composed of $600,000 in nonpension assets including a house, $1.2 million in 
a defined contribution pension plan, and $100,000 in a supplemental plan such 
as an individual retirement account (IRA) or a Keogh plan. Table 3.1 shows 
the tax rates faced by estates processed in  1982, 1984, 1988, and  1996. The 
estates of these individuals faced radically different tax laws. We cannot pre- 
sent all of the details in this introduction, but one important difference is that 
before  1983 pension accumulations were completely exempt from the estate 
tax. In addition, beneficiaries could take advantage of  1  0-year forward averag- 
ing on their income tax if the inherited pension plan funds were withdrawn in 
a lump sum. The result is that in 1982 the heir was able to consume more than 
60 percent of the value of the inherited supplemental pension plan; the com- 
bined tax rate was less than 40 percent. 
In contrast, consider the inheritance of the beneficiary in 1996. Because the 175  The Taxation of  Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
estate tax exclusion of pensions assets was limited to $100,000 as of  1983 and 
eliminated in 1985, and because the excess accumulation tax became effective 
in 1987 (and 10-year averaging was replaced with 5-year averaging), the 1996 
heir can spend less than  15 percent of the value of the inherited supplemental 
plan. This case is far from extreme. We will describe cases in which the total 
marginal tax rate on assets in qualified pension plans passing through an estate 
ranges from 92 to 96.5 percent. The highest such rate we have seen exceeds 99 
percent. The numbers in table 3.1 immediately  suggest at least two things. 
First, any pension saving strategy adopted more than a few years ago needs to 
be reviewed, given how drastically the rules have changed. And second, large 
pension accumulations are taxed very heavily when they pass through estates. 
So heavily, in fact, that withdrawing pension assets before death, if at all pos- 
sible, needs to be considered. 
The next section of  the paper outlines the various tax systems that affect 
pensions, including the excess distribution tax, the federal and state income 
tax systems, and the estate tax system. Most important, it describes how these 
tax systems interact to  determine the effective combined marginal tax rates. 
Section  3.3  explores  the  combinations  of  pension  plan  generosity,  career 
length, investment returns, and income levels that can lead to pension accumu- 
lations subject to the excess distribution tax or excess accumulation tax. It be- 
comes  clear  that  people  with  relatively  modest  incomes  (e.g.,  $30,000 to 
$40,000 at age SO) can face these taxes if they have long careers and relatively 
generous contribution rates. These taxes are certainly not limited to the “rich.” 
In fact, due to the power of compound interest rates, the group that is the most 
likely to face the penalty taxes are long-term, lifetime savers. 
In section 3.4 we present analysis of  the relative attractiveness  of  saving 
through the pension system versus conventional saving in a taxable account. 
We consider whether the pension laws continue to encourage saving once the 
excess distribution and excess accumulation taxes are taken into account. We 
also evaluate lifetime supplemental participation and one-time extra contribu- 
tions. Bond and stock investments are considered separately. In addition, we 
examine the outcomes of  saving with and without pensions in terms of  both 
retirement resources and net assets left to beneficiaries. 
In section 3.5 we consider the choices available to someone who has already 
accumulated more than enough to trigger the penalty excise taxes. The ques- 
tion  is whether  a person  in  such a situation should take distributions suffi- 
ciently large to require the payment  of the excess distribution tax or should 
leave the money in the pension and risk the excess accumulation tax. We dem- 
onstrate that the taxation of large pension accumulations is much more burden- 
some when they pass through an estate-so  much so, that it is almost always 
better to incur the excess distribution tax and avoid the excess accumulation 
levy. 
In section 3.6 we examine the efficient allocation of  assets between pension 
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held outside a pension plan are taxed very differently. However, all asset re- 
turns are taxed identically inside a pension account. We show that extremely 
large efficiency gains are possible simply by locating different assets optimally. 
Our conclusions are summarized in section 3.7. 
3.2  The Tax Systems and How They Interact for Pensions 
Pensions are almost universally thought to be attractive tax shelters. Indeed, 
since the 1986 tax reform, pensions  along with owner-occupied  housing and 
municipal bonds are sometimes thought to be the only significant tax shelters 
remaining. As emphasized above, however, large pension withdrawals or large 
pension accumulations  at death are hardly  sheltered from taxes-in  fact the 
tax rates they face are among the highest  in our society. To understand  the 
taxation of large pension distributions and accumulations, one needs to have a 
basic knowledge of the various tax systems operating in the United States. This 
section presents some essential facts about the major tax systems that impinge 
on pension assets: the excess distribution tax and the excess accumulation tax, 
the federal and state income tax systems, and estate taxes. We discuss how they 
can interact to generate total marginal rates over 95 percent. 
3.2.1  The Excess Distribution and the Excess Accumulation Taxes 
The excess distribution and the excess accumulation taxes were enacted as 
part of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 (TRA86). Their purpose was to penalize 
people who use the favorable tax treatment of pensions to accumulate wealth 
beyond what is reasonably required for a comfortable retirement. Effectively, 
beginning  in  1987, any withdrawals from qualified pension  plans exceeding 
$150,000 per year face a 15 percent additional income tax. The $150,000 fig- 
ure was left unchanged between 1987 and 1995 but was raised to $155,000 for 
1996 and now is effectively indexed for inflation. It will be increased  from 
time to time in minimum increments of $5,000 to reflect inflation. The 15 per- 
cent surtax is not deductible against either federal or state income taxes, so it 
simply adds 15 points to a household‘s marginal income tax rate on pension 
withdrawals. It is often referred to as the “success tax” since it can be triggered 
by particularly successful investment returns or by career earnings success. 
A companion  15 percent excess accumulation tax was also part of TRA86. 
It applies to the estates of people who die with pension accumulations deemed 
excessive. Excessive accumulation is defined as assets that exceed the value of 
a single life annuity paying out $155,000 per year,’ for someone with the life 
expectancy of a person the same age as the deceased. Assets in qualified plans 
over this amount face the extra  15 percent tax. The government gives guide- 
lines regarding the permissible rate of interest to use in determining the value 
1. This number will be adjusted for inflation in the future in exactly the same manner as the 
withdrawal number for the excess distribution tax. 177  The Taxation of Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
Table 3.2  Federal Marginal Income Tax Rates for 1996 
Range of Taxable Income ($) 
Marginal 
Tax Rate (%)  Single  Manied 
15  0-24,OOO  0-40,100 
28  24,000-58,150  40,100-96,900 
31  58,150-121,300  96.900-147.700 
39.6  263,750+  263,750+ 
36  121.300-263,750  147,700-263,750 
of a single life annuity and also provides a table of life expectancies. The bor- 
derline between “allowable” and “excessive” accumulations depends on age. 
Using the currently allowed life expectancy tables and the permissible 8.2 per- 
cent interest rate gives the following limits: $1,243,612 at age 65, $1,165,166 
at age 70, $955,358 at age 75, and $794,158 at age 80. The excess accumula- 
tion tax can be deferred if  assets are transferred to a surviving spouse, so it 
only affects single people, widows and widowers, and married individuals who 
name a nonspouse as a beneficiary. 
3.2.2  The Federal Income Tax 
A potential advantage of  pension saving relative to conventional saving is 
that the marginal income tax rate in retirement may be lower than the rate when 
contributions are made. However, this advantage almost certainly does not 
apply to someone facing the excess distribution tax. Since the excess distribu- 
tion tax only applies if  the individual is withdrawing more than $155,000 of 
taxable funds from qualified pension plans and since such a person would also 
almost always face income taxes on 85 percent of social security income, the 
person would be in one of the top two federal income tax brackets. 
The 1996 federal income tax brackets are shown in  table 3.2. The actual 
marginal tax rates can be higher than shown, however, especially for high- 
income households. The $2,550 per person personal exemptions are phased 
out between adjusted gross incomes (AGIs) of  $117,950 and $240,450 for 
singles and between $176,950 and $299,450 for married couples filing jointly. 
In  these income ranges, the effective marginal rate is increased by  approxi- 
mately 0.72 percent for each personal exemption, meaning that a family of 
four in the published 36 percent rate category actually would face a 38.88 
percent marginal tax rate. Further, when AGI exceeds $117,950 ($58,975 for 
singles), there is a partial phaseout of itemized deductions. The total of item- 
ized deductions is reduced by 3 percent of the amount by which the taxpayer’s 
AGI exceeds $117,950, with the limit of  the reduction being 80 percent of 
itemized deductions. Since the vast majority of taxpayers with incomes above 
$1  17,950 are itemizers (property taxes and state and local income taxes alone 
make this advantageous), this partial phaseout of  itemized deductions raises 178  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
the effective marginal tax rates. The phaseout of  itemized deductions alone 
raises the 36 percent bracket to 37.08 percent and the 39.6 percent bracket to 
approximately 41 percent. In conjunction with the phaseout of  personal ex- 
emptions, the 36 percent bracket can effectively involve a 40 percent marginal 
tax rate for a family of four. The final factor raising effective marginal tax rates 
is the 2.9 percent Medicare tax that applies to labor income. This tax is shared 
SO-50  between employer and employee, with a self-employed person paying 
the full 2.9 percent. A high-income individual can face a marginal federal tax 
rate on self-employment income of  nearly 44 percent (taking only the treat- 
ment of itemized deductions and the Medicare tax into account), even though 
39.6 percent is listed as the highest tax bracket. As recently as 1992 the top 
effective marginal tax rate was 31 percent. It is clear that the  1993 Deficit 
Reduction Act, which introduced  the 36 and 39.6 percent  brackets  and the 
phaseout of personal exemptions and itemized deductions, significantly raised 
the marginal tax rates on high-income taxpayers. 
One aspect of the income tax law that does not apply to pension assets but 
that does affect investments outside the pension  system is the treatment  of 
capital appreciation. Increases in  the value of  assets are not taxed until the 
gains are realized. Realized gains resulting from the sale of assets are taxed at 
ordinary income tax rates (although realized gains can be offset with realized 
losses on the sale of other assets in the same year) with one important excep- 
tion: the maximum rate applying to capital gains is 28 percent. Finally, the cost 
basis for inherited assets is reset to the value of the assets at the time of their 
transfer, implying that the appreciation of these assets completely escapes in- 
come taxation. 
3.2.3  State Income Taxes 
It is hard to generalize about state income taxes. Forty-three of the 50 states 
impose state income taxes of  varying design and with marginal rates as high 
as 12 percent. State income taxes are deductible from federal income taxes. 
In the examples in this paper, we often use the  1996 California top marginal 
income tax rate of 9.3 percent  (it had been  11 percent before  1996), which 
applies to taxable income over $31,700 for singles and $63,400 for married 
couples filing a joint return. For a Californian facing the 39.6 percent federal 
rate, the total federal and state marginal tax rate is 46.41 percent, taking into 
account the partial phaseout of  itemized deductions. If  this individual with- 
drew more than $155,000 from qualified pension plans, and thus faced the 15 
percent excess distribution tax, then the total marginal tax rate on withdrawals 
above the $155,000 would be 61.41 percent. These 46.41 and 61.41 percent 
marginal rates appear in a number of our later examples. 
3.2.4  Federal and State Estate Taxes 
The federal schedule of  estate taxes is shown in table 3.3. This schedule 
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Table 3.3  Federal Marginal Estate Tax Rates for 1996 
Marginal 
Tax Rate (%) 
Fair Market Value of Estate 





















ferred at death. The table reflects both the unified credit that basically exempts 
lifetime transfers of $600,000 or less and the phaseout of the graduated rates 
and unified credit that occurs between taxable transfers of $10 million and $2 1 
million. This phaseout of the benefit of the graduated rates is what causes the 
effective marginal rate to be 60 percent in this range. Because of this phaseout, 
both the average and the marginal tax rates are 55 percent for estates above 
$21.04 million. One extremely important feature of  the federal estate tax is 
that there is an unlimited marital deduction, which basically means that the tax 
does not apply to transfers between spouses. 
The federal estate tax allows a limited credit for state estate and inheritance 
taxes. The amount of the allowed credit depends on the size of the estate. For 
instance, for estates valued between $2,040,000 and $2,540,000 the allowable 
credit for state death taxes is $106,800 plus 8 percent of the amount by which 
the estate exceeds $2,040,000. This means that a state could levy estate taxes 
of this amount without increasing the total taxation of the estate. Many states 
design their death duties with this in mind and charge precisely  the amount 
that the federal government will credit against the federal tax. Such state estate 
taxes are referred to as “soak up” taxes. The “soak up” refers to the allowed 
credits (and not the wealth of the estate!). Some states (New York, e.g.) have 
estate taxes that exceed the amount that can be credited against the federal 
estate tax. We do not consider such cases in this paper, but it should be clear 
that this  would  simply  make the high marginal tax  rates we compute even 
higher. 
The estate  tax  treatment of  pension  accumulations  changed  dramatically 
with the passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. Be- 
fore this aspect of the 1982 law became effective in 1983, benefits payable to 
a beneficiary from qualified accounts (both defined benefit and defined contri- 
bution plans, IRAs, Keoghs, etc.) were completely excluded from the taxable 
estate. The 1982 act limited the exclusion of pension assets from taxable es- 
tates to $100,000. Even that limited exclusion was repealed with the Deficit 180  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
Reduction Act of  1984. The effect of the 1982 and 1984 law changes is that 
pension wealth, which was completely sheltered from the estate tax for people 
who died before 1983, was completely taxable for deaths occurring after 1984. 
3.2.5  The Interaction of the Taxes on Pensions 
We have already discussed the taxation of distributions from qualified retire- 
ment plans in retirement. All distributions are subject to full ordinary income 
taxation at both federal and state levels. Distributions over $155,000 are sub- 
ject to the additive 15 percent excess distribution tax. Since the excess distribu- 
tion tax is not deductible with respect to federal and state income taxes, it is 
equivalent to an additional state income tax (which would be deductible from 
the federal income tax) of  approximately  25 percent. The combined excess 
distribution tax and federal income tax rates go up to about 56 percent, and the 
total marginal rate (including state-level taxation) can be roughly 61.5 percent. 
The taxation at death is more complicated. First, the excess accumulation 
tax is calculated on the amount by which total wealth in qualified plans exceeds 
the value of  a single life annuity as previously  described. Federal and state 
estate taxes are then computed, deducting the amount of the excess accumula- 
tion tax from the taxable estate. If the estate exceeds $3 million, for instance, 
and is therefore in the 55 percent federal estate tax category and state estate 
taxes do not exceed the amount creditable against the federal tax, then the 
combined marginal rate of an estate facing the 15 percent excess accumulation 
tax is 61.75 percent (note that .15 + (.85)(.55) = .6175). 
This is not the end of the story, however. Keep in mind that personal income 
taxes have never been paid on the qualified assets being transferred through 
the estate. The beneficiary is still liable for these taxes, and much of the 61.75 
percent estate and excess accumulation tax is not deductible in calculating the 
amounts. The excess accumulation tax is not deductible from either the state 
or the federal income tax. Generally, only the state portion of the estate tax is 
deductible in determining state income taxes. For example, a Californian who 
was the beneficiary of a qualified plan that was part of a $3 million estate and 
who faced a state income tax rate of 9.3 percent would have to pay state income 
taxes on 9 1.84 percent of the value of the inherited qualified plans, even though 
these plans may have already triggered estate and excess accumulation taxes 
amounting to 61.75 percent of the value of the plans. This adds another 8.54 
percent to the 61.75 percent, bringing the total tax bill to 70.29 percent. But 
there is more. We still have to calculate the federal income tax on the inherited 
money. Only the federal portion of the estate tax and the state income tax are 
deductible for federal income tax purposes; this means that the beneficiary will 
have to pay federal income tax on 52.87 percent of the value of  the inherited 
qualified plans even though previous taxes amounting to 70.29 percent of the 
value of the qualified plans have already been paid. An effective federal mar- 
ginal tax rate of 41 percent on this 52.87 percent requires us to add another 
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gered by  each incremental dollar in qualified plans to 91.97 percent. This is 
not even an extreme case. The tax rate would be several points higher if the 
estate were in the 60 percent estate tax bracket; the rate would also be higher 
in New York or any other state that has an estate tax exceeding the amount the 
federal government will allow as a credit against the federal obligation. The 
most extreme case we have examined involves a total marginal tax rate of 99.73 
percent. This case involves a resident of New York with excess accumulations 
in qualified plans, a total estate between $10 and $21 million, and heirs in the 
top income tax bracket. 
3.3  How Rich or Successful Do You Have to Be in Order to Face the 
"Success" Tax? 
Are the extraordinarily high marginal tax rates that can result from "exces- 
sively large" pensions only a problem for the extremely rich or for those with 
unusually good fortune in terms of financial returns? The answer is no, These 
tax rates are not limited to those with very high incomes or with large windfall 
gains. Rather they are imposed  on people who save systematically  through 
pensions over long periods of their work lives. Even savers of  modest income 
may find that they are penalized for their thrift. 
The wealth that accrues in a defined contribution  pension  plan is easy to 
compute. There are two key determinants-the  contributions that are made at 
each age and the rate of return earned on those contributions.  If  we let C(t) 
be the contributions  at age t  and r be the real rate of return earned on those 
contributions, then accumulated wealth at age A, W(A),  is simply given by 
A 
W(A)  = c  C(t)(l + T)~-', 
/=a 
where a is the age at which contributions  commence. If  contributions  are a 
fixed fraction f of labor income and if  real labor income grows at rate g per 
year, then 
(2)  C(r)  = fY(a)(l  + g)'-"  for all r  2 a, 
and therefore 
(3) 
The continuous compounding version of equation (3) is simply 
A 
W(A)  = fY(a)  2  (1 + g)'-"(l +  T)~-' 
I=(I 
With  these  simple compound interest equations, we  can determine what 
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Table 3.4  Examples of Pension Plans 
Variable  Example  I  Example 2  Example 3 
Age of initial contribution a  25  40  25 
Initial salary Y(n)  $50,000  $100,000  $25,000 
Salary increases g  .02  .02  .02 
Salary at age 50 Y(50)  $82,030  $12 1,899  $4  1 ,O I5 
Contribution ratef  .10  .I5  .I0 
Asset allocation  S&P 50W  S&P 5m  Growth stocks" 
Rate of return r  .08  .08  .10 
"he  assumed rates of return  are conservative relative to actual realized rates  of return  between 
1926 and 1995. Ibbotson Associates (1996) reports that the arithmetic average of real returns on 
the S&P 500 was 9.2 percent, while the geometric mean was 7.2 percent. The arithmetic mean is 
appropriate for estimating the expected or average future outcome, whereas the geometric mean 
of the distribution gives the  median future outcome. For  small company stocks, the arithmetic 
mean of real returns was 14. I  percent, whereas the geometric mean was 9.1 percent. 
Table 3.5  Pension Accumulations for Examples 1,2, and 3 
Accumulation  Example I  Example 2  Example 3 
Wealth at 50 W(50)  $476,9  1 1  $272,066  $320,149 
Wealth at 55 W(55)  $75 1,673  $5 13,289  $542,086 
Wealth at 60 W(60)  $  I,  160,690  $879,542  $902,275 
Wealth at 65 W(65)  $1,767,524  $1,424,334  $1,485,406 
Wealth at 70 W(70)  $2,665,623  $2,224~3  13  $2,427,904 
rate of return, and career length can generate sufficient pension accumulations 
to require the payment of the excess distribution or excess accumulation tax. 
Table 3.4 summarizes three examples that will be discussed. The wealth accu- 
mulations in these pension plans at various ages, W(A),  are shown in table 3.5. 
The numbers in the table are generated using the discrete annual compounding 
of equation (3). 
Consider first example  1, someone who is starting a job at age 25, having 
just completed an MBA. The initial salary is $50,000. The basic employer- 
provided pension plan is a defined contribution plan involving a contribution 
of  10 percent of  salary (perhaps funded partly by the employer and partly by 
the employee). The employee expects to continue to work with this employer, 
or for an employer with an equivalent plan, for his or her entire career. Future 
salary increases are expected to be 2 percent above inflation, implying that the 
salary will reach $82,030 by  age 50 in real dollars. The employee is allowed 
to choose how to allocate the investments, and this person chooses to invest in 
the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500. We have assumed an 8 percent real rate 
of  return  for the S&P 500, which is well below  its  1926-95  average of  9.2 
percent. 
While the hypothetical person in example 1 enjoys a relatively high income, 
most people would not classify this individual as rich. Nonetheless, by age 70 183  The Taxation of  Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
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Fig. 3.1  Pension accumulations in examples 1,2, and 3 
this person would accumulate pension wealth  in excess of  $2.6 million  and 
would almost certainly face the excess distribution or excess accumulation tax. 
If he or she should die at age 70 with this  accumulation, the marginal rate 
faced by the estate and heirs would exceed 90 percent. 
Example 1 is a person who began pension saving at the relatively young age 
of 25. Example 2 is an individual who does not begin saving until age 40 but 
then has a relatively generous plan (with 15 percent contributions) and a high 
salary ($100,000). This person also invests in the S&P 500 and accumulates 
more than $2.2 million in pension wealth by age 70. 
Example 3 is a person who earns much less, earning $41,000 at age 50. This 
person  contributes  10 percent  of  income to a pension  plan  and  places  the 
money in growth stocks that earn 10 percent over inflation. This is well below 
the 14.1 percent average real return earned on small company stocks over the 
1926-95 period. This person would also accumulate almost $2.5 million in the 
pension plan by  age 70. If the person in example 3 had earned an 8 percent 
rate of return  (as assumed in examples  1 and 2), the accumulation at age 70 
would have been $1.33 million, still enough to trigger the success tax. 
The wealth accumulations of examples 1,2,  and 3, together with the amount 
above which accumulations are considered to be excessive, are shown in figure 
3.1. As can be seen, all three of these individuals have excessive assets before 
age 65 and have over $1 million in the excessive category by age 70. 
Each of  the  above examples  uses hypothetical returns and assumes only 
stock investments. We  now turn to a fourth individual and consider the out- 
comes under three alternative asset allocations: all stocks (S&P 500), all bonds, 
and a 50-50  allocation between stocks and bonds. This person is a leading- 
edge baby boomer, who was born in 1946 and entered the workforce in 1971. 
We  refer to this person  as “the  software engineer.” His salary in  1971 was 
$15,000 (in nominal terms), and he has always contributed 10  percent of salary 184  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
Table 3.6  Example 4 with Alternative Asset Allocations 
Example 4A  Example 4B  Example 4C 
Initial nominal salary in 
1971 at 25 
Salary in  1996 at 50 
Future real raises 
Contribution rate 
Asset allocation 
Rates of return 
Wealth at 50 W(50) 
Wealth at 55 W(55) 
Wealth at 60 W(60) 
Wealth at 65 W(65) 
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to his pension plan. His real salary grew at 2.5 percent per year between 1971 
and 1995. In 1996 our software engineer is age 50  and has a salary of $102,579. 
His pay is projected to grow in real terms at 1 percent per year thereafter. The 
rates of return earned between 1971 and 1995 (ages 25-49)  are the actual re- 
turns earned by the S&P 500 and by a diversified portfolio of high-grade long- 
term corporate bonds. The returns are taken from Ibbotson Associates (1996). 
The assumed real returns from age 50 onward are 8 percent for the stock port- 
folio and 4 percent for the bonds. Thus, in these examples, at least half of the 
returns are, not hypothetical, but actual returns realized in  the market since 
1971. Table 3.6 shows the specifics of examples 4A, 4B, and 4C, including the 
wealth accumulation at various ages. 
The same wealth accumulation information is plotted in figure 3.2. There it 
is clear that our software engineer can face the success tax with any of the three 
asset allocations. With 100 percent stocks, the assets are too large at roughly 
age 58, with a 50-50  allocation at age 61, and the all-bond investor qualifies 
as an excess accumulator at age 68. There is nothing extreme about any of 
these examples. All pertain to diversified portfolios (not, e.g., to a single stock 
that appreciated  1,000-fold). All of  the salaries are well under the $150,000 
that can be used to compute pension benefits in  employer-provided defined 
contribution pension plans. None of the examples assume a supplemental plan 
(e.g., 401(k) plan) in addition to the basic pension plan, and reasonable contri- 
bution rates are assumed in each case. 
Equation (3) clarifies that the wealth accumulated at any particular age de- 
pends on five variables (salary levels, contribution rates, starting age, rate of 
salary growth, and rate of return on investments). The examples have shown 
that sufficient wealth can be accumulated to trigger the excess accumulation 
tax without extreme parameter values. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 further clarify the 185  The Taxation of Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
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Fig. 3.2  Software engineer’s pension accumulations  (example 4) 
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Fig. 3.3  Rates of return and income levels generating “excess accumulations” 
range of parameter values that can lead to the imposition of the 15 percent tax. 
Any combination of parameters above the curves in figures 3.3 and 3.4 leads 
to the accumulation of  more than $1.2 million at age 70, which is roughly the 
dividing line between allowable and excess accumulations. It is not difficult or 
unusual to face these situations. Figure 3.3 pertains  to a person  who begins 
work at age 25, experiences annual salary increases of 2 percent above infla- 
tion, contributes  10 percent  to a pension plan,  and works until age 70. The 
figure shows the combinations of income at age 50 and realized rates of return 
that would yield excessive accumulations at age 70 under these assumptions. 
For instance, a person who earns $85,000 at age 50 and who realizes a 5 per- 
cent real rate of return on pension investments would accumulate $1.2 million 186  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 3.4  Ages at which contributions commence and contribution rates 
generating “excess accumulations” 
by  age 70 and would face the excess accumulation tax. Any salary trajectory 
that is higher  or rate of return  that is better will  land this person in excess 
accumulation territory. 
Figure 3.4 pertains to a person who earns $80,000 at age 50, experiences 2 
percent real salary increases throughout his or her career, and realizes an 8 
percent return  on pension  investments.  Under these assumptions, the  figure 
shows the combinations of contribution rates and ages at which contributions 
begin that lead to excess accumulations. For example, under these assumptions 
a person who begins contributing 8.7 percent of salary to a pension plan at age 
35 will attain the excess accumulation boundary by age 70. On the other hand, 
someone with these circumstances who waits until  age 40 to begin pension 
saving would have to contribute about 12 percent to reach the excess accumula- 
tion range by age 70. Any combination of contribution rate and age of contribu- 
tion commencement lying above the curve in figure 3.4 will lead to asset accu- 
mulations facing the success tax. 
The rates of return assumed in this section have all been real rates (above 
inflation). The $1.2 million boundary between excessive and allowable accu- 
mulations  is in  1996 dollars. Implicitly,  our calculations recognize that the 
amounts that trigger the success tax are indexed for inflation. Nonetheless, we 
find that the success tax is not only a problem for those with extremely high 
incomes. It is a consideration for large numbers of lifetime savers, even those 
with incomes near the median of  the society. The real income profile of  ex- 
ample 3, for instance, is roughly at the 70th percentile of earnings, meaning 
that about 30 percent of all American  workers earn more.  Even our higher 
income examples, which are certainly in the top 5 percent of U.S. workers, are 
relevant to millions of individuals. We are presently doing research to further 187  The Taxation of Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
clarify how many  people need to pay attention to the considerations  of  this 
paper. Even at this stage, however, we know that it is a large number of people 
who account for a  very  large  fraction  of  the  total  personal  saving  in  the 
United States. 
3.4  When Are Pensions a Tax Shelter? When a Tax Trap? 
Whether it pays to save through a pension plan depends on the retirement 
consumption that could be supported through wealth accumulated in this way 
compared to the retirement consumption that would be provided by  “conven- 
tional” saving-outside  a pension plan. Of course, people presumably realize 
that they face some mortality risk and may also care how their heirs would 
fare under the two saving alternatives. In this section we consider the relative 
performance  of pensions and conventional saving in providing retirement re- 
sources and in transfemng wealth to heirs. We consider separately cases in 
which bonds and stocks are purchased. We also examine both systematic life- 
time  saving  and one-time supplemental  saving. The potential  impact of  the 
excess distribution tax and the excess accumulation tax on the relative advan- 
tage of pension saving is examined. 
3.4.1  Lifetime Saving: Investment in Bonds 
The formulas that describe asset accumulation through pension and conven- 
tional saving for retirement are straightforward. To be precise about the basic 
calculations and variants of  them, we set out the formulas here. First, some no- 
Age at which retirement saving starts 
Retirement age 
Pension contributions at age t 
Wealth accumulation using pensions at retirement age A 
Saving outside of pensions, set to equal the after-tax cost of  C(t)  so that the 
Wealth accumulation using nonpension saving at retirement age A 
After-tax benefit stream enjoyed in retirement from pension saving 
After-tax benefit stream enjoyed in retirement from nonpension saving 
Fraction of wages contributed to pensions 
Labor income at age t 
Nominal rate of  wage growth 
Nominal rate of return on investments 
Length of benefit payouts in retirement (could be life expectancy) 
Combined state and federal marginal tax rate on labor income 
Combined state and federal marginal tax rate on pension payouts 
Combined state and federal marginal tax rate on dividends or interest 
Combined state and federal marginal tax rate on realized capital gains 
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Using  this  notation  we  consider  first  the  net-of-tax  retirement  income 
stream, B,,  that can be supported through pretax contributions  C(r)  under a 
pension plan. The equations are easier to manipulate if we use the continuous 
time formulation and therefore continuous compounding. The pension contri- 
bution as a function of time is given by 
(5)  C(t)  = fY(t) = fY(a)eP"-"', 
where we assume that labor income grows at rate g. The accumulated pension 
wealth at retirement age A is then 
(6)  %(A)  = jc: C(r)er(A-'J  dt. 
Assuming a constant nominal payment over L years, the (fair) after-tax annuity 
payment that this wealth could finance is given by 
(7)  B,  =  (1 - 
=  (1 - 
where the r/( 1 -  e-rL) term is the annuity payment that $1 of wealth can sup- 
port for L years. The alternative strategy is to save for retirement outside the 
pension system. In this case the saving has to be done with after-tax dollars. 
Leaving consumption unchanged, the amount of saving that can be done as a 
function of time is therefore 
(8) 
The wealth accumulated by retirement in this case is given by 
S(r) =  (1 - T,)fY(a)e"'-"'. 
(9) 
The annuity payment that this wealth can finance is 
w,(A)  = jaA  S(t)er(l-qllA-'J dr . 
The advantage of pension plan saving versus conventional saving for retire- 
ment is given by the ratio of  B, to B,.  Although there are many parameters in 
equations (7) and  (lo), the formulas are easily evaluated  for any particular 
set of values. Table 3.7 presents several different parameter combinations that 
describe the circumstances of  different  savers. Note that f and Y(a)  are not 
included in the parameters describing each case. They appear in both equations 
(7) and (10) in such a way as to drop out of the expression for BJB,.  Note also 189  The Taxation of Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
Table 3.7  Advantage of Using Pensions for Retirement Saving: Eight Cases with 
Bond Investments 

































































BJB,  2.680  1.847  1.330  1.240  1.090  1.096  0.963  1.176 
that equations (7) through  (10) apply a single tax rate to particular  kinds of 
income, rather than the progressive rates in the tax code. Thus the equations 
and the results in table 3.7-as  well as those in table 3.8 below-are  best 
interpreted as relevant for a particular marginal calculation. Rather than indi- 
cating whether a person  should have a pension  at all, the results are better 
interpreted as indicating whether additional lifetime saving should be  done 
through a pension plan (such as a supplemental 401(k) plan) or whether sup- 
plemental saving should be done outside of the pension system. Or the calcula- 
tions  can be  interpreted  as  indicating  whether  to  contribute  an  additional 
amount to a pension  plan  (say increase the contribution rate from 10 to  11 
percent) or to save the marginal 1 percent outside the pension system. 
Under case  1 there is a tremendous advantage to saving even incremental 
amounts through a tax-sheltered pension plan. It is probably such an example 
that most financial advisers have in mind when they recommend participating 
in qualified pension plans to the maximum extent possible. Case 1 is a person 
who is participating in a defined contribution pension plan (or possibly a sup- 
plemental 401(k) plan) between ages 30 and 70 and who is investing the contri- 
butions in corporate bonds that yield an 8 percent return. This person receives 
a 6 percent nominal wage increase each year. The analysis in this section is in 
nominal terms because it is nominal income that is taxed. After retirement, an 
equal nominal amount of money is withdrawn each year between ages 70 and 
85. This person faces a combined federal and state income tax rate of 46.41 
percent, before and after retirement, on both labor income and interest income. 
Under these assumptions, the 2.680 number at the bottom of the case 1 column 
indicates that the person who saves in pension plans will be able to spend 168 
percent more from retirement savings than the person who accumulated tax- 
able bonds outside the pension system. This is an enormous advantage to pen- 
sion saving, particularly when the consumption that was forgone to save while 
working is the same under both saving modes. 
This case, however, is not very realistic, particularly for high-income indi- 190  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
viduals with high marginal tax rates. For this group, taxable corporate bonds 
are a poor investment outside a pension plan. Instead, they could invest in tax- 
free municipal bonds  with an implicit tax rate of  approximately 28 percent 
(which is the approximate difference between the rate of return on corporate 
vs. municipal bonds). Under case 2 the tax rate on bond investments outside 
the pension is lowered to 28 percent, reflecting the fact that municipal bonds 
dominate corporate bonds for high-tax-rate investors. Now, the net advantage 
of  pension saving is reduced to 85 percent,  still very large. But what if  this 
person will face the excess distribution tax on retirement benefits? In this case, 
the marginal tax rate on money withdrawn from pension accumulations can be 
61.41 percent. This is case 3, under which the advantage of pension corporate 
bond saving is only 33 percent over municipal bond saving.? 
The first three cases are for very high income individuals who are in top tax 
brackets both while working and in retirement. However, the previous section 
of the paper showed that one need not have an income nearly so high to face 
the excess distribution tax on marginal pension contributions. Cases 4 through 
7 are for someone in the 3 1 percent federal marginal tax bracket during his or 
her work career and in the 36 percent federal marginal tax bracket in retire- 
ment. In these cases the individual faces the 15 percent success tax and a 9.3 
percent state income tax. The advantage of saving with pensions is reduced 
relative to cases  1, 2, and 3 because cases 4 through 7 face higher basic tax 
rates in retirement than while working. Case 4 shows someone who spends 
incremental retirement accumulation over 15 years. This person gains 24 per- 
cent from using pensions for retirement saving. Case 5 shows that if he or she 
took the money out in the first year of retirement, the advantage of using pen- 
sions would fall to only 9 percent. Case 6 returns to withdrawing the money 
over 15 years, but the extra contributions  do not begin until  age 40. In this 
case, the benefit of  using pensions  is 9.6 percent. Case 7 shows that even a 
long-term bond accumulator can be worse off for having used the pension sys- 
tem. This individual takes the money out in the first year of retirement and 
actually has 3.7 percent less to spend than if he or she had been accumulating 
municipal bonds yielding 5.76 percent. 
The last case in table 3.7 is a very high income individual (like those in 
cases 1,2,  and 3), who starts saving at age 40 and faces the excess distribution 
2. Mankiw and Poterba (1996) report an implicit tax rate for municipal bonds well below the 
28 percent figure here. They compare the yields on 20-year Treasury bonds with the yield on high- 
quality municipals of the same maturity. The implicit tax rate in 1987-94  averaged 17.21 percent. 
The interest on Treasury bonds is not subject to taxation at the state level, however, and therefore 
they are not an ideal instrument to hold in pension accounts. The Mankiw-Poterba evidence, how- 
ever, might indicate that the correct implicit tax rate to apply for municipal bonds vs. corporate 
bonds is about 20 percent. A 20 percent implicit tax rate on municipals, rather than the 28 percent 
that we assumed, would make using pensions for retirement saving less attractive. E.g., the BJB, 
figures for cases 2, 3, and 4 would have been 1.559, 1.123, and 1.046, respectively. 191  The Taxation of Pensions:  A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
tax. In fact, cases 3 and 8 are identical except that the person in case 3 saves 
for 40 years whereas the person in case 8 saves for 30 years. The net advantage 
of  using  the  pension  system  to buy  corporate  bonds  versus  accumulating 
municipal bonds amounts to 17.6 percent. 
The general message of table 3.7 is that once the option of investing in mu- 
nicipal bonds is recognized and also once the fact that extra pension saving is 
likely to face the excess distribution tax is taken into account, the advantage of 
using pensions for retirement saving is much more modest than the 168 percent 
of case 1. In fact, the advantage may be positive or negative, but it is unlikely 
to exceed the 33 percent of case 3. Most of these cases assume that the individ- 
uals receive pension benefits until age 85. We have so far not examined what 
happens to these accounts if the individual dies before they are depleted below 
the amount that would trigger the excess accumulation tax. We examine that 
case a little later. 
3.4.2  Lifetime Saving: Investment in Stocks 
We now turn to accumulating incremental wealth with stocks. The pension 
accumulation formulas (5)  through (7) are unchanged because all money taken 
from pension accumulations is taxed the same regardless of how it was gener- 
ated. However, outside savers face different tax rates depending on how invest- 
ment returns are paid (e.g., dividends, capital gains, municipal bond interest). 
Equations (8) through (10) assumed that all of the return on the bond invest- 
ments took the form of interest payments. With stock investments, we need to 
treat accrued capital gains, realized capital gains, and dividends separately. 
Consider a stock portfolio or mutual fund portfolio whose total return r is 
divided into three components 
(1  1)  r  = r, + r, + 5, 
where r, is the dividend yield, rc represents the rate of realized capital gains, 
and ra represents accrued or deferred capital gains. Dividends are taxable as 
ordinary income, realized capital gains are taxed at preferential rates (with a 
maximum rate of 28 percent), and the taxes on accrued gains can be deferred 
and possibly escaped (such gains are never taxed if the asset passes through an 
estate). If we let 
be the after-tax rate at which equities compound, then equation (9) can be 
modified to 
W,(A)  = joA S(t)eR'A-')  dt 
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where T, is the effective capital gains tax rate payable as the money is spent in 
retirement. That is, T, is given by 
where CJA)  is the cost basis of the stock portfolio when the saver is age A. If 
we let R be the currently taxable part of the portfolio's return, that is, 
(16)  R  = ~(l  - I;) + <(l - c), 
then at the time of  retirement the cost basis of the portfolio would be 
(17)  C&A) =  S(t)eR"A-'l  dr 
With these equations we can look once again at the ratio of B, to B,. Several 
cases are described in table 3.8. 
Once again, the first case shows a very big advantage to saving for retire- 
ment, or incremental saving for retirement, through a pension plan. Case 1 is 
a person  saving for retirement between  ages 30 and 70, investing in a stock 
portfolio with an annual dividend yield of 2 percent, and realizing capital gains 
of 2 percent per year. The remaining 7 percent of the return takes the form of 
unrealized  or  accrued  capital  gains. Again, the  retirement  accumulation  is 
spent over the 15 years between ages 70 and 85. This individual has very high 
income while working and in retirement and always faces top tax rates. Case 1 
does not take into account the excess distribution tax, however. It shows that 
the net advantage of  saving with pensions is 101.2 percent. 
This large benefit  to pensions is eroded considerably  if the success tax is 
applicable, as in case 2 where the advantage of pensions  is reduced to 44.9 
percent. Examining cases 2,3,  and 4 reveals the advantage of investing in stock 
portfolios that minimize taxable distributions  when equities are held outside 
of a pension. The only difference between the three cases is the composition 
of  returns  between  dividends,  realized  capital gains, and unrealized  capital 
gains. The portfolio held in case 3 is more tax efficient than that held in case 
2, and hence the advantage of  using pensions is much smaller,  18.5 percent 
instead of 44.9 percent. The portfolio in case 4 generates only unrealized capi- 
tal gains, and it actually provides more retirement income if assets are accumu- 
lated outside the pension system. The reason is that the rate of compounding 
is identical inside and outside a pension in this case, but the total tax burden is 
less for outside saving. Cases 5, 6, and 7 again reveal the advantage of tax- 
efficient stock portfolios, although this time for a lower income saver (someone 
in the 3 1 percent federal marginal tax bracket before retirement and in the 36 
percent bracket after retirement). Pensions are less advantageous for someone Table 3.8 
Parameter  Case I  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6  Case 7  Case 8  Case 9 
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with this pattern of tax rates. The case 7 person ends up with 11 percent less if 
he or she acquires stocks inside a pension rather than simply buying stocks or 
equity mutual funds outside the pension system. Case 8 is the same as case 5, 
except that the maximum capital gains tax rate has been lowered to 14 percent 
before the retirement saving is withdrawn. This significantly reduces the ad- 
vantage of  saving within a pension, since only assets held outside a pension 
can take advantage of  the lower capital gains tax rate. This example is a re- 
minder that all of these calculations are vulnerable to changes in the basic tax 
structure. Pension saving, which is taxed only upon distribution is particularly 
vulnerable to future changes in the tax rules. Case 9 is the same as case 6, with 
two exceptions: first, saving is not begun until age 40, and second, the money 
is withdrawn in  1 year instead of 15. This person still saves for retirement for 
30  years. The final column of the table indicates that this person  would be 
approximately  4  percent  worse  off  with  pension  rather  than  conventional 
saving. 
The lesson of tables 3.7 and 3.8 is that the advantage of systematically con- 
tributing more to a pension plan over an entire career depends crucially on the 
investment chosen, the length of the career, and the precise tax rate that will 
be applied when benefits are withdrawn. If the 15 percent tax on excess distri- 
butions is triggered, then the net advantage of pensions is greatly reduced and 
may be negative. 
3.4.3  One-Time Contribution, One-Time Withdrawal: Investment in Bonds 
We  now turn to a somewhat different margin and a simpler set of  cases. 
Instead of considering a slightly higher contribution rate over the entire career, 
consider someone who is debating whether to make a one-time supplementary 
pension  contribution. The opportunity  to make this contribution  may  come 
from temporarily taking a second job or from self-employment. For simplicity, 
we assume that the saver will withdraw the proceeds from the contribution at 
a known age. If the potential contribution would be made at age a,  and with- 
drawn at age a2,  which is more than 59 %, then each dollar contributed would 
permit retirement consumption of 
If the investment  is a bond  and if the person in question faces a combined 
federal and state marginal income tax rate in excess of  28 percent, then the 
reasonable alternative for an outside investor is municipal bonds yielding ap- 
proximately .72r. In this case, each before-tax dollar would permit retirement 
consumption of 
(19) 
Clearly, one difference between expressions (1  8) and (19) is that (1  8) depends 
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on the future income tax rate while retired, whereas (19) depends on the cur- 
rent income tax rate on labor income. If TR  5  T,, then clearly expression (18) 
exceeds expression (19) and using the pension vehicle is advantageous, more 
so for longer periods of time (a, -  a,)  between contribution and distribution. 
However, if  T, 2  T, either because tax rates are increased or because of the 
excess distribution  tax, then by  equating expressions  (18) and (19) we can 
solve for the break-even period of time a2 -  a,. 
1  1-Ty 
a2 - a, =  -In  - 
.28r  (1 - 
For reasonable parameters for a high-income person facing the success tax 
(i.e., Ty  = .4641, T, = ,6141, and r = .08), the break-even holding period is 
14.7 years. For periods greater than that, using the pension system will provide 
more retirement con~umption.~  After 25 years, for instance, the pension system 
will produce 26 percent more money than municipal bonds held outside the 
pension system, even accounting for the excess distribution tax. The advantage 
of using municipal bonds rather than taxable corporate bonds outside of a pen- 
sion is shown by this result: the break-even period of time is only 8.85 years if 
both the inside and the outside investments are made in corporate bonds. 
3.4.4 
(19) must be replaced with 
One-Time Contribution, One-Time Withdrawal: Investment in Stocks 
For stocks, we once again must use the R and R previously defined. Equation 
where 
(22) 
Table 3.9 evaluates the break-even holding period, a, -  a,,  as a function of 
the tax and return parameters. A comparison of equations (18) and (21) shows 
that using pensions for this saving dominates conventional saving if TR  5  T,, 
so we do not report such cases. The interesting circumstances occur when the 
excess distribution tax is part of TR.  Once again, we are reminded that even 
though all investments are treated the same in a qualified pension account, they 
are taxed quite differently if  they are held outside. Case 1 shows a stock or 
stock mutual fund with a total nominal return of  11 percent, split between a 2 
percent dividend yield, a 2 percent return of realized capital gains, and a 7 
3. If the implicit tax rate on municipal bonds is 20 percent instead of  28 percent, the breakeven 
period would be 20.5 years instead of 14.7 years. 196  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
Table 3.9  Break-Even Holding Period for Using Pensions for Investments 
in Stocks 
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percent return of unrealized capital gains. With the tax parameters shown, in- 
cluding a 28 percent tax rate on realized capital gains and a 15 percent excess 
distribution tax, the break-even holding period is 11 years. Case 3 shows just 
how sensitive this result is to the payout characteristics of the stock portfolio. 
With the same tax rates, it never makes sense to hold a stock portfolio that 
yields only unrealized capital gains inside a pension plan. The reason is that 
the tax deferral feature of  the pension plan is completely redundant and the 
total taxes are actually slightly less if the asset is not put in a pension. In terms 
of  the notation that we have developed, notice that for case 3, R  = r and at 
T, = .4641, Tc = .28, and TR  = .6141, (1 -  TJ(1 -  Ty)  > (1 -  T,).  Cases 4 
and 5 pertain  to someone with somewhat more modest income levels. Once 
again, we see that the pension system is less attractive for this person than for 
the richer persons in cases 1 and 2, with the break-even periods being consider- 
ably longer. Case 6 is the same as case 5, except that the capital gains rate has 
been reduced, making pensions far less attractive, with the break-even period 
being an extraordinarily long 48 years. 
3.4.5 
We now turn to the situation in which the supplemental saver dies before 
spending the money. Take the example of someone who saves some money at 
age a, over  and  above base  pension  plan  contributions  and  is considering 
whether to use a supplemental pension vehicle such as a 401(k) account. As- 
sume that the person anticipates facing either the excess distribution tax when 
withdrawals are made or realizes that the estate would face the excess accumu- 
lation tax if he or she dies before spending the money. The person cares about 
his or her beneficiaries in the event that death occurs before the money is spent. 
Since it is quite simple to transfer wealth including qualified accounts to one's 
spouse without  tax, we consider a single person or someone who  will ulti- 
mately be the surviving spouse. 
In order to calculate what the heirs would inherit in the two cases (pension 
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saving vs. outside saving) we need to introduce yet more notation. The follow- 
ing definitions are useful: 
Tx 







Tax rate on excess distributions and excess accumulations 
Federal marginal estate tax rate 
State marginal estate tax rate 
Federal marginal income tax rate of beneficiary 
State marginal income tax rate of beneficiary 
Net-of-tax amount received by  the beneficiary from pension saving that 
Net-of-tax amount received by the beneficiary from conventional saving that 
took place t years before death 
took place t years before death 
Consider someone contemplating an extra $1 contribution to a 401(k) plan at 
age a,. If that person dies at age u2,  the extra money that the beneficiary can 
spend because of this saving is given by 
(23)  er(n2-af)[(l  - T,)(l - T,) - n, - (1 - (1 - c)T;)(l  - n,)T,f], 
where II, is the state income tax owed and is given by 
(24) 
Note that the excess distribution tax is not deductible against state and federal 
income taxes and that only  some of  the regular estate taxes are deductible. 
Only the state portion of the estate tax is deductible from the base of the state 
income tax, and only the federal portion is deductible against the base of the 
federal income tax. If the extra saving had not been invested in the 401(k)  but 
an equivalent before-tax amount had been used to purchase municipal bonds, 
then the beneficiary would have netted 
(25) 
where Ty  is still the combined federal and state marginal income tax rate of the 
saver and we are assuming that municipal bonds have an implicit tax rate of 28 
percent. On the other hand, had the money been used to purchase a stock port- 
folio held outside of the pension system, the beneficiary would have received 
(after all taxes) 
(26) 
where 
n,  = (1 - (1 - T,)TL)T;. 
(1 - T,)(1 - 
e.72r(02 -  "1) 
(1 - T,)(1 - 
eR(a~-ai) 
R  = ~(l  - T,) + <(l - T,) + 5, 
Equations (23), (25), and (26) illustrate that the advantage of using pensions 
is that, in general, the money compounds at a faster rate. However, the compli- 
cated string of taxes that are applied to pension accumulations passing through 198  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
Table 3.10  Supplemental Saving with Bonds: Three Cases Where the Money 
Passes through an Estate 
Parameter  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 







Total tax rate on incremental 
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an estate may more than offset this advantage. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the 
net advantage to the beneficiary of  using pensions for bonds and stocks, re- 
spectively. 
Case 1 of table 3.10 shows someone who has a total estate of $3.1 million, 
with sufficient accumulations in qualified plans to face the excess accumula- 
tion tax, and whose beneficiary is in top federal and state income tax brackets. 
If the money were saved in 8 percent bonds and held for 30 years before the 
saver died, then the beneficiary would net only 65.3 percent as much as if the 
original saver had invested in 5.76 percent municipal bonds. So, in this case, 
the use of  a 401(k) plan would significantly reduce the net inheritance. The 
total tax rate faced by the money in the incremental 401(k) account is 92 per- 
cent. The break-even period for the two strategies (401(k) vs. municipal bonds) 
is 49 years. Case 2 is someone whose estate consists primarily of  an “over- 
stuffed’ set of qualified plans but who is not as wealthy as the person in case 
1. The heir is also in a lower federal income tax bracket. In this case the total 
tax rate faced by the incremental pension accumulation is 84 percent. The ben- 
eficiary only gains from the pension saving strategy over the municipal bond 
strategy if the holding period is 30 years or longer. The individual depicted in 
case 3 is much wealthier and faces the federally imposed estate tax rate of 60 
percent. Some states (such as New York) impose state death duties that exceed 
the amount that can be credited against the federal estate tax and hence impose 
higher tax rates than in case 3. Even so, the combined effective tax rate on the 
case 3 incremental 401(k) account is 96.41 percent. The beneficiary gets only 
3.5 percent of the accumulation, with the government taking 96.5 percent. This 
person was going to face high estate taxes and income taxes with any strategy, 
but the pension saving choice provides the beneficiary with less than one-third 
as much as the municipal bond strategy, even after 30 years. 199  The Taxation of Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
Table 3.11  Supplemental Saving with Stocks: Six Cases Where the Money Passes 
through an Estate 
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Total tax rate on incremental 
401(k)  dollar ($)  9 1.97  91.97  83.86  83.86  96.41  96.41 
H,(30)/Hs(30)  ,522  .334  .803  .513  ,262  ,168 
Break-even period (years)  74  Never  45  Never  120  Never 
Turning now to the cases involving stock investments shown in table 3.11, 
one can see that using pensions for supplemental saving is never a good choice 
for beneficiaries, at least not for the cases shown involving the excess accumu- 
lation tax being added to the estate tax. The first two cases refer to the same 
individual as in case 1 of table 3.10. The only difference between case 1 and 
case 2 of table 3.1 I is that case 2 involves a stock portfolio generating only 
unrealized capital gains, whereas case 1 has some current dividends and real- 
ized capital gains. In case 1, with a 30-year holding period, the heir ends up 
with almost twice as much money if pensions are avoided, and in case 2, three 
times as much. 
Cases 3 through 6 show other possible circumstances. Case 6 is the most 
extreme, with the beneficiary receiving only one-sixth as much money via the 
supplemental pension accumulation as he or she would have if the stock port- 
folio had been kept outside the pension system. 
One feature of cases 2, 4, and 6 that may not be obvious is that the ratio 
H,(t)/H,(t) is independent oft. In cases where the investment itself offers com- 
plete tax deferral, the advantage or disadvantage of using pensions for saving 
(at least in terms of how much money your heirs will receive) is independent 
of how many years before death the saving takes place. This implies, for in- 
stance, that if a 70-year-old with the wealth and tax circumstances of case 2 
makes an extra contribution  to a pension plan and then dies, the heir would 
receive only one-third as much as if the money had been kept out of the pen- 
sion system. This same one-third figure applies after 30 years or 50 years if the 
investment is in land or growth stocks whose return comes completely in the 200  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 3.5  Pensions vs. conventional saving: net proceeds in retirement 
and to heirs 
Note; Assumptions:  15 percent excess distribution tax and excess accumulation tax, 55 percent 
estate tax, 41  percent federal income tax, 9.3 percent state income tax, 28 percent capital gains 
tax,  I1 percent nominal return on stocks, including 2 percent dividends and 2 percent realized 
capital gains. 
form of  unrealized  capital gains. For case 6, pension saving results in a net 
inheritance of one-sixth as much as conventional saving. 
The lesson from the analysis of  this section of  the paper is that once one 
faces the excess distribution tax  or excess accumulation tax, the  gain from 
pensions in providing for retirement is modest at best and the loss in terms of 
the amount that one's beneficiaries will receive can be very significant. This is 
graphically illustrated in figures 3.5 and 3.6. Note that figure 3.5 pertains to 
someone with the same wealth and tax parameters as case 1 in both tables 3.9 
and 3.11. That is, this is someone facing the success tax and high income and 
estate tax rates. The action being considered is a supplemental investment in a 
conventional stock mutual fund with an  1  I  percent nominal return composed 
of 2 percent dividends, 2 percent realized capital gains, and 7 percent unreal- 
ized capital gains. For holding periods up to 11 years, pension saving provides 
less retirement income than conventional saving; for longer holding periods 
pension saving provides more. For all holding periods, the inheritance of heirs 
is less with pension than with conventional saving. Even with holding periods 
of  greater than  11 years, the gain in retirement income is less than the loss in 
the inheritance of the heirs. 
The contrast between figure 3.5 and figure 3.6 illustrates the importance of 
the tax efficiency  of stock portfolios held outside of  pension  accounts. The 
only difference is that the investment vehicle is now an asset that generates 
only unrealized capital gains. Now, for all periods of 30 years or less, conven- 201  The Taxation of  Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
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Fig. 3.6  Pensions vs. conventional saving: net proceeds in retirement and 
to heirs with non-dividend-paying  growth stocks 
Nore: Assumptions:  15 percent excess distribution tax and excess accumulation tax, 55 percent 
estate tax, 41 percent federal income tax, 9.3 percent state income tax, 28 percent capital gains 
tax, 11 percent nominal rate of return on stocks, all in the form of  unrealized capital gains. 
tional (supplemental) saving dominates pension saving; if the money is with- 
drawn in retirement, there is more net money to spend if conventional saving 
is chosen, although the outcome is very nearly the same for periods of 20 years 
or more. If  the individual dies before spending the money, the heirs receive 
three times as much if conventional saving is used than if a supplemental quali- 
fied pension plan is used. The reason that the outcome ratio shown in figure 
3.6 is flat for the case when the money passes through an estate is that the 
compounding effect is the same whether or not the money is put in a pension 
(even conventional saving has complete tax deferral), so the ratio of outcomes 
is completely determined by the alternative tax burdens. 
Figure 3.6 makes clear that it would not make economic sense for someone 
facing the success tax to make supplementary contributions to pension plans 
and invest the money in non-dividend-paying growth stocks. Better outcomes 
can be achieved with conventional saving. In this sense, the pension system 
does not offer this person any extra incentive to save. While figure 3.5 is not 
as unambiguous, it still indicates that it makes no sense to use pension saving 
for that particular type of  stock portfolio, for holding periods of less than  11 
years, and probably not for much longer periods if the saver cares about what 
heirs will receive in the event that he or she dies before depleting this account. 
Our conclusion is that once a person is on a trajectory  that will trigger the 
success tax, there is little or no economic incentive to save additional money 
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3.5  The Incentives to Take Distributions 
The previous  section demonstrated that the tax system, particularly  the ex- 
cess distribution tax and the excess accumulation tax, effectively removes the 
incentive to save supplemental amounts via the pension system for people who 
already  anticipate pension  accumulations  that will be  deemed excessive. In 
this section we consider a separate question: should someone who has already 
accumulated more than enough to trigger the success tax accelerate distribu- 
tions, perhaps incumng the excess distribution tax, or should he or she leave 
the money in the pension system as long as possible and defer the payment 
of taxes? 
We consider first a person who retires at age 65 and who has pension assets 
exceeding $2 million. The software engineer in example 4A (table 3.6) would 
have been in such a position by age 65. Should such a person begin withdraw- 
als immediately and reduce the funds subject to the excess distribution tax (and 
potentially  the excess accumulation tax) or should this person maximize the 
deferral advantage of pensions by waiting until age 70% to begin withdrawals 
and then distribute only the minimum amounts required by the IRS? In analyz- 
ing this question we follow the method of  analysis of Lockwood ( 1993). 
Consider two alternative strategies for someone with large pension accumu- 
lations at age 65: strategy  1, withdraw $155,000 per year between ages 65 and 
69, and strategy 2, roll over $155,000 per year between ages 65 and 69 from 
existing defined contribution pension plans into a new, separate IRA. We as- 
sume that the individual has a combined marginal state and federal income tax 
rate of 46.41 percent. We also assume that the minimum distributions from the 
IRA beginning at age 70% under strategy 2 face the excess distribution tax and 
hence a combined marginal tax rate of 61.41 percent. The IRA is invested in 
corporate bonds earning an 8 percent nominal return. In order to keep track of 
which strategy is the more advantageous, we assume that the after-tax distribu- 
tions of strategy  1 are invested in a municipal bond fund earning 5.76 percent. 
The results are shown in table 3.12. 
The after-tax  accumulation in the municipal bond fund reaches $466,004 
with the final distribution from the primary pension plan  at age 69. If  these 
funds were left untouched and continued to earn 5.76 percent, they would total 
$1,350,507 by age 88. Contrast that with the outcome under strategy 2. By age 
70%, the separate IRA would have grown to $982,069, and minimum distribu- 
tions would have to commence. We have used an 18-year-term-certain payout 
in calculating the minimum distributions, following the example in Lockwood 
(1993). The 18 years is the joint life expectancy of the owner of the IRA and 
his or her spouse. The initial distribution at age 70 is $51,687. The minimum 
payouts continue to grow each year until the IRA is exhausted with the final 
payout of $206,538 at age 88. The net after-tax proceeds of these distributions 
are again invested in  a municipal bond fund paying  5.76 percent. After the 
final distribution is added to the fund, the balance stands at $1,262,351. The 203  The Taxation of Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
Table 3.12  Early Distribution vs. Maximum Deferral 
Strategy  I: Early Distribution  Strategy 2: Maximum Deferral 
Taxable  After-Tax  Minimum  After-Tax 
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difference between the fund balances of strategy  1 and strategy 2 at age 88 is 
$88,156, which represents the net advantage of the early withdrawal choice. 
So the message from table 3.12 is that the early withdrawal strategy (where the 
five $155,000 distributions avoid the excess distribution tax) is more advanta- 
geous than the strategy of  postponing  distributions  to the maximum extent 
possible in order to take advantage of the deferral feature of pensions. This 
conclusion depends on the age of  the pension owner and on the rates of return 
that can be earned both inside and outside the pension plan. However, it clearly 
indicates that withdrawing money before age 70% can be advantageous for 
someone facing the success tax. It would be worthwhile for any such person 
to do a calculation like the one illustrated in table 3.12. 
So far, we have seen that the early withdrawal choice is in the interest of this 
particular couple should the surviving spouse live to age 88. It is even more 
advantageous if the widow or widower should die before that age. For instance, 
at age 75 strategy 1 has a municipal bond fund worth $652,106 whereas strat- 
egy 2 has an IRA with a balance of $1,063,249 and a municipal bond fund of 
$166,988. If the owner and spouse died at this age, the net inherited funds for 204  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
the beneficiaries would be significantly greater with strategy  1. Depending on 
the precise size of the total estate, the tax rate of  the beneficiaries,  and their 
state of residence, the difference could easily exceed $100,000. We conclude, 
then, that people over age 59% who have very large pension accumulations 
face strong incentives  to withdraw  the  money early. If, in contrast to these 
examples, they do not reinvest the money outside the pension, this incentive for 
early distributions may translate to an incentive to consume rather than save. 
The example of table 3.12 does not take into account the recently legislated 
three-year (1  997-99)  moratorium on the excess distribution tax mentioned in 
section 3.1. In this period, distributions can be taken in any amount from quali- 
fied plans without triggering the excess distribution tax. This obviously sig- 
nificantly enhances the advantage of taking large distributions during this time 
window. In fact, the optimal policy for the person in the above example would 
be to distribute more than $155,000 per year during 1997-99  so as to minimize 
or eliminate the possibility  that the pension funds will face either the excess 
distribution tax or the excess accumulation tax. The legislation did not suspend 
the excess accumulation tax applying to large pension accumulations passing 
through estates. This magnifies the incentive to get funds out of the pension. 
We  now turn to a different case, someone who is considerably older and 
who still has pension assets that the government classifies as excessively large. 
Consider, for example, a single person who has $2 million in pension assets at 
age 75, roughly $1.05 million beyond the amount that would trigger the excess 
accumulation tax. If this person dies without withdrawing  the $1.05 million, 
the heirs may receive a net benefit of $84,300 from its existence. Even this is 
not the extreme case, as earlier in the paper we have shown cases where this 
money would face tax rates of  over 96 percent rather than the 9 1.97 percent 
rate assumed here. However, if the money were withdrawn (and the individual 
died  before  spending  any  of  it)  the  beneficiaries  would  receive  at  least 
$182,300 even if all of the money withdrawn faced the excess distribution tax. 
If  the $1.05 million  were withdrawn during the  1997-99  window, the heirs 
would receive more than $3 10,000 after all taxes due to the moratorium on the 
excess distribution tax. In either case (with or without the moratorium), the tax 
system is not neutral with respect to the distribution decision: in fact, it favors 
taking distributions in retirement and strongly penalizes those dying with large 
pension assets. 
We conclude from the two examples just discussed that pension tax law is 
not only antisaving  with respect to additional contributions for people with 
substantial pension assets, it also is antisaving in that it gives such people a 
strong incentive to withdraw their funds in retirement (even if such withdraw- 
als trigger the excess distribution tax) rather than leave them in the pension 
plan and let them pass through an estate. Thus the consistent saver has an in- 
centive to withdraw funds from the saving pool even in the absence of any need 
or desire to use the proceeds for consumption. The combination of  the taxes 
triggered by withdrawals (even excess distributions) with the estate tax later 205  The Taxation of Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
applying to the unspent money held outside the pension system is considerably 
less than the taxes faced by  excessively large pension accumulations passing 
through an estate. 
Throughout the paper, we have been calculating the outcomes for nonspouse 
beneficiaries as if they withdrew the inherited accumulations immediately. In 
some circumstances the plan can be set up so that the heirs are permitted to 
take distributions from the inherited plans over their own life expectancies,4 
thus extending the tax deferral nature of the account. The excess accumulation 
tax and the estate taxes cannot be deferred, but the income taxes of the heirs 
would not be payable immediately, but rather payable as the distributions are 
taken from the account. The government requires that the beneficiary begin 
distributions  immediately, but in some cases they can be  extended over the 
entire life expectancies of the heirs. If this option is available, it may be very 
advantageous. Of course, if the heirs are to use the inherited IRA over their 
own lifetimes, then they must find a source for the estate tax and excess accu- 
mulation tax other than the pension  money itself. These options involve de- 
tailed financial planning and depend on specific circumstances that we cannot 
describe exhaustively in this paper. 
3.6  Asset Allocation: Which Assets Should Be Held inside a 
Pension Plan? 
In this section we deal with a related question concerning the often ignored 
issue of  asset allocation. The previous  sections have indicated  that  lifetime 
savers are likely to face either the excess distribution or the excess accumula- 
tion tax and therefore may want to hold some investments outside of the pen- 
sion system. Now we address the issue of which assets should be held where. 
Where should one hold corporate bonds  or growth  stocks? Does it make a 
difference? The tax system operates in such a way that it can make a big dif- 
ference. 
The intuition regarding this kind of asset allocation goes as follows. Recall 
that the tax treatment of  pensions  is completely  independent  of the type of 
assets in the account. Before-tax money can be saved, but all withdrawals are 
taxed as ordinary income. While it is true that there is the success tax to worry 
about, even that  and the estate tax do not differentiate  between  the type of 
income that  was generated  inside the account (capital  gains,  interest,  divi- 
dends, rents, etc.). The reason that it makes a difference which assets are held 
inside the pension account and which are held outside is not that they are taxed 
differently inside of a pension account but that different types of income are 
4.  If  the owner of an IRA had begun distributions before his or her death, a nonspouse benefi- 
ciary (or a spouse who elects not to roll over the account into his or her own name) inheriting the 
IRA must take distributions at least as rapidly as under the method being used at the owner’s death. 
However, if the owner had not begun distributions, and if the plan is explicitly set up to allow it, 
the beneficiary may be able to take distributions extended over his or her lifetime. 206  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
taxed very differently when the assets are held outside, in taxable accounts. 
For instance, municipal bonds can be free of state and federal income taxation 
but carry an implicit tax (or lower interest yield) of  about 28 percent. Realized 
capital gains are taxed more lightly than ordinary income; currently, the maxi- 
mum rate on realized capital gains is 28 percent,  and there have been many 
proposals to lower this rate further. Accrued capital gains (perhaps resulting 
from retained earnings) are tax deferred (i.e., they face no taxes until the gain 
is realized). Further, the cost basis of  appreciated  assets held outside of pen- 
sions is reset when they pass through an estate, so these capital gains can com- 
pletely escape taxation. This resetting of the basis occurs, whether or not the 
estate is large enough to pay estate taxes. 
The basic answer to the question of  how to allocate one’s assets between 
those held inside a pension and those held outside is to hold inside those assets 
that would be taxed most harshly on the outside. For instance, if you want to 
hold a total portfolio consisting of zero- or low-dividend growth stocks, high- 
dividend utility stocks, and long-term corporate bonds, it makes sense to place 
all of the corporate bonds and utility stocks inside the plan before any of the 
relatively  lightly taxed  growth stocks are placed  inside. Further, the outside 
taxation of the growth stock portfolio depends on how one manages the real- 
ization of capital gains. This does not say that it is irrational to have all stocks 
or even all growth stocks both inside the pension and outside. What it does say 
is ifyou are going to have some highly taxed assets such as corporate bonds or 
utility  stocks, then they  first belong inside the qualified plan. They are the 
assets that  gain the most  from the tax  deferral  feature of  the plan. Growth 
stocks, to the extent that they yield unrealized capital gains, already have that 
feature. 
A person who is making investments both in a currently taxable environment 
and through pension accumulations may not only want to allocate the assets of 
a given portfolio in terms of where they are held but may also find it profitable 
to change the composition  of the portfolio itself. For instance, someone who 
wants the risk-return trade-off  of large-capitalization  stocks (such as offered 
by the S&P 500) may be able to achieve that position or something very close 
to  it  with  a  portfolio  consisting  of  high-grade  corporate bonds  and  low- 
dividend small-capitalization growth stocks. By appropriately positioning the 
bonds and growth stocks (bonds first in the pension fund and growth stocks 
first outside of the pension fund) the net-of-tax return can be enhanced relative 
to holding the S&P 500 in both environments. 
There is a second asset allocation effect that generally reinforces the one 
just discussed. The second consideration  involves risk allocation. Because of 
the excess distribution tax and the excess accumulation tax, the marginal tax 
rates  faced by  assets in pensions  are more progressive than those faced by 
outside  investments.  This extra  progressivity  differentially  reduces  the  ex- 
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Table 3.13  Comparing “Balanced Portfolios” inside the Pension Plan and 
outside of It with a Tax-Efficient  Asset Allocation 
Inefficient Saving  Efficient Saving 
Pension account 
Nonpension saving 
Retirement advantage without 
Retirement advantage with excess 
Beneficiary’s advantage without 
Beneficiary’s advantage with excess 
excess distribution tax 
distribution tax 
excess accumulation tax 
accumulation tax 
50% Growth stocks 
50% Corporate bonds 
50% Growth stocks 
50% Municipal bonds 
100%  Corporate bonds 





Nore: Assumptions: Corporate bonds yield 8 percent, municipal bonds yield 5.76 percent, stocks 
earn 13 percent, with  1 percent dividend yield and  1 percent realized capital gains. Individual has 
a combined federal and state marginal income tax rate of 46.41 percent and saves between ages 
25 and 70. Saving is proportional to labor income, which grows at 6 percent per year. 
ages one from taking risks that might lead to “success,” at least within the pen- 
sion environment. The optimal response is to hold riskier assets outside of the 
pension system and safer ones within it. 
One question regarding these asset allocation effects is whether they involve 
minor adjustments in returns or whether they amount to important considera- 
tions. The best way to answer that is to consider some examples. The issue is 
interesting only if someone is saving sizable amounts both inside the pension 
system and outside of it. Consider someone who contributes an amount to a 
pension fund equal to the amount saved outside of the fund, and assume this is 
done for the entire career. He or she might, for instance,  save 5 percent  of 
income in pensions and 5 percent conventionally. This person chooses to invest 
half of the total money in bonds and half in common stocks. Two strategies are 
depicted in table 3.13. The first, labeled “inefficient saving,” involves devoting 
half of the saving to growth stocks and bonds, both inside the pension system 
and outside of  it. The second strategy, which involves the same total asset allo- 
cation and therefore the same total risk, allocates all of the pension saving to 
bonds and all of the nonpension saving to growth stocks. This second strategy 
is more tax efficient because all of the relatively lightly taxed stocks are kept 
in the taxable environment whereas all of the more heavily taxed bonds are 
placed in the tax-deferred accounts. The advantage is not as great as might be 
expected because of the existence of municipal bonds, which, by assumption, 
involve an implicit tax rate of only 28 percent. Nonetheless, there is a notice- 
able net advantage to the more efficient asset allocation strategy, and this ad- 208  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
Table 3.14  Efficiently Allocating Two Equity Mutual Funds between Pension 
Accounts and Nonpension Savings Accounts 
Inefficient Saving  Efficient Saving 
Pension account 
Nonpension saving 
Retirement advantage without 
excess distribution tax 
Retirement advantage with 
excess distribution tax 
Beneficiary’s advantage without 
50% Growth stock fund 
50% Equity income fund 
50% Growth stock fund 
50% Equity income fund 
100% Equity income fund 
100% Growth stock fund 
9.0% 
15.7% 
excess accumulation tax  16.9% 
Beneficiary’s advantage with 
excess accumulation tax  23.8% 
vantage can be obtained with little or no change in risk exposure. If, in retire- 
ment, the money is withdrawn and does not trigger the excess distribution tax, 
the withdrawals would be 2.6 percent higher with the efficient strategy. If the 
15 percent excess distribution tax applies to these withdrawals, then the effi- 
cient saver ends up with almost 13 percent more net retirement income. 
If the saving is not withdrawn in retirement but instead becomes part of an 
estate, the advantage to the beneficiaries of efficiently allocating assets is even 
greater. In this case, the advantage grows to 15.2 or 25.5 percent depending on 
whether the excess accumulation tax is involved or not. The reason that effi- 
cient asset allocation is even more advantageous in this case is that the unreal- 
ized capital gains on assets held outside of pension plans completely escape 
taxation when the assets pass through an estate. Thought of as pure efficiency 
gains, the numbers in table 3.13 are impressively  large. Remember these are 
gains with little or no cost. A person might, for instance, receive  13 percent 
more from retirement saving simply because he or she had allocated assets in 
an efficient manner. 
Table 3.14 illustrates that this is not just a stocks-versus-bonds phenomenon. 
In  fact, what table  3.14 shows is another lifetime saver who saves an equal 
amount in pension accumulations and in a taxable environment. This person 
wants to invest in a balanced portfolio  of  equities consisting half of  growth 
stocks and half  of  income-oriented  stocks such as utilities.  A growth stock 
mutual fund is once again modeled as having a nominal return of  13 percent, 
including a 1 percent dividend yield and 1 percent realized capital gains. This 
fund would have to be tax conscious in order to hold the realized capital gains 
to this level. The second fund is an equity income fund with a nominal yield 
of  11 percent, including a 6 percent dividend rate and 1 percent realized capital 
gains. The stocks in such a fund might include utilities and preferred issues. 209  The Taxation of Pensions: A Shelter Can Become a Trap 
The naive or inefficient policy for this saver would be to have the same 50-50 
allocation between these two types of funds both inside the pension and in the 
outside taxable environment. The much more efficient strategy is to place the 
fund generating the most currently taxable income inside the pension and place 
the fund generating the most unrealized capital gains in the taxable environ- 
ment. Table 3.14 indicates that the gain to placing these investments efficiently 
is even greater than in the stocks-versus-bonds case just discussed. 
The reason that the gain is in general larger in this case is that the effect of 
taxes on the return of the equity income fund is more than the 2.24 percent 
difference between the yield on taxable and municipal bonds. This means that 
there is a larger advantage to efficiently locating the income mutual fund than 
there is to efficiently locating bonds  in the previous  example. The 9 to  16 
percent improvement in retirement income reflected in table 3.14 strikes us as 
an extremely large potential payoff for such a simple adjustment in asset allo- 
cation. 
3.7  Conclusions and Final Remarks 
Pensions are thought to be one of the few remaining tax shelters providing 
attractive incentives for people to save for retirement. The excess distribution 
tax and the excess accumulation tax were included in the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 to prevent people from taking advantage of the favorable tax treatment 
of pensions to amass wealth beyond what is thought to be reasonably necessary 
for a comfortable retirement. The wisdom of this policy is open to question. 
People who increase saving because of the tax shelter opportunity offered by 
pension plans, or for other reasons like the payroll deduction feature of many 
pension plans, do not reduce the resources available to the rest of  the popula- 
tion. In fact, individual savers reap only a portion of the social return of the 
incremental capital. If the extra pension saving results in extra capital for the 
economy, then this extra capital pays corporation income taxes and the pension 
saver ultimately pays personal income taxes, which improves the overall bud- 
get picture for everyone in the economy. The social return to the capital sig- 
nificantly exceeds the private return received by the pension saver. 
For the most part, we have refrained from evaluating current tax policy to- 
ward pensions from a social perspective and have simply analyzed how the tax 
system operates and how an individual might optimally respond. This analysis 
has led to several striking results: 
The tax rates faced by pensions deemed “too large” can be extraordi- 
narily high. The marginal  rate on distributions  over $155,000 can be 
roughly  61.5 percent.  The effective marginal  tax rate  faced by  large 
pension  accumulations  passing through  an estate can dwarf this rate, 
however, reaching 92 to 96.5 percent. 210  John B. Shoven and David A. Wise 
These high tax rates, which include the excess distribution and excess 
accumulation taxes, can be faced by savers who do not have extraordi- 
narily high incomes. The success tax is not limited to the rich, but rather 
primarily  affects  lifetime  savers.  For example, someone who works 
between ages 25 and 70, makes $40,000 at age 50, and contributes  10 
percent to a pension plan invested in the S&P 500 will likely be penal- 
ized by the success tax for overusing the pension provisions. 
The advantage of pensions relative to conventional saving is greatly re- 
duced and in many  cases eliminated once accumulations  exceed the 
amounts that will trigger the success tax. Even in cases where additional 
pension saving still provides more resources in retirement than conven- 
tional  saving, when the plan owner dies, the heirs get less than  they 
would have if the saving had been done outside of a pension plan. 
The advantage of pension  saving is reduced by the availability of tax- 
advantaged investments outside of pension plans. Examples are tax-free 
municipal bonds and tax-efficient low-dividend stock portfolios. 
Not only is there little, if any, incentive to continue to save via pensions 
once the excess distribution and excess accumulation taxes become ap- 
plicable,  there is a strong incentive  to withdraw  money  while  living 
rather than risk the nearly confiscatory tax rates faced by pension assets 
transferred through estates. This means that there is an incentive to con- 
sume more in retirement than would otherwise be the case. 
Individuals can realize significant efficiency gains by allocating their 
investments appropriately between pension accounts and outside hold- 
ings. Simply locating  assets in their most  advantageous environment 
could improve the net proceeds of saving by almost 25 percent. 
These findings are sufficiently important to warrant more consideration of 
the tax treatment of large pension accumulations  on several fronts. First, we 
are currently engaged in further research to clarify the number of future elderly 
households who need to be concerned about the excess distribution and excess 
accumulation taxes. We know that it is a distinct minority of the population, 
but we are also quite sure that it is a large number of households who account 
for a significant portion  of  total  personal saving.  Second, further  attention 
needs to be given to the transfer of pensions through estates. The estate taxa- 
tion of pensions changed dramatically in the 1982-86  period with almost no 
study or evaluation. Now that it is recognized  that pensions  are the primary 
vehicle for personal  saving in the economy, a careful reconsideration  of the 
legislation of the early and mid-1980s is called for. As this paper has demon- 
strated, once the excess distribution and excess accumulation taxes are under- 
stood, these taxes are likely to become quite effective at discouraging pension 
saving and hence they will reduce economic welfare in an economy that surely 
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Comment  Alan J. Auerbach 
This paper is a good illustration of the miracle of compound interest. An upper- 
middle-income person who saves consistently throughout his or her life in a 
pension plan will quite possibly be subject to very heavy taxes on withdrawal 
of funds in retirement or when passing assets through an estate. It will be useful 
to break my comments down into two areas, regarding methodology and as- 
sumptions. 
Methodology 
The paper’s basic approach is to consider, for different portfolios, the tax 
implications of a variety of marginal decisions: saving for retirement in a pen- 
sion plan versus outside a pension plan, saving to leave a bequest in a pension 
plan versus outside, withdrawing funds from a pension plan as soon as possible 
rather than letting them accumulate, and so forth. To illustrate the effects of 
these choices, the authors examine the outcomes for people in different situa- 
tions with respect to age, income level, and pension plan generosity. They find 
that, in many cases, the individual will be subject to an excise tax on excess 
accumulations (if he or she dies) or excess distributions (if he or she uses the 
funds during retirement) and that, facing excise tax, the individual may wish 
not to save in a sheltered form or may wish to withdraw funds from a sheltered 
form as soon as it is possible to do so without additional penalty. 
The basic algebra  seems correct to me,  although I think the intuition for 
some of the results could stand further development. For example, pensions 
look so much worse for funds passing through an estate than for those used in 
retirement (cf. figures 3.5 and 3.6) because of the additional benefit of the step- 
up in basis at death that accrues only to assets held outside pension funds. 
How much do these comparisons tell us about behavioral distortions? Not 
as much as they might appear to do. We are learning about marginal tax rates 
in certain situations, not how likely these situations are to occur or, of equal 
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importance, how difficult it would be to avoid them. That is, how likely is it 
that these outcomes will occur, for an empirically reasonable pattern of wage 
growth and pension accumulation? How much less must one contribute to pen- 
sion accounts to avoid the penalty thresholds? How much do we need to give 
our children annually to avoid estate tax? And so forth. 
Ideally, we would like this analysis to be placed in a model of  life cycle 
saving that takes account of the probabilities of reaching each state being con- 
sidered here and the further avoidance activity that can increase the probability 
of more favorable (from a tax perspective) states. This is not an easy task, and 
the paper’s calculations provide valuable information simply by illustrating the 
possibility of very high marginal tax rates facing the decisions being studied. 
Ultimately, though, the seriousness of these potential distortions depends criti- 
cally on what motivates saving-for  example, on the extent to which estates 
represent the  byproduct  of  precautionary  saving as opposed to planned  be- 
quests to heirs. 
Assumptions 
Now let us consider the paper’s underlying assumptions. I have already men- 
tioned the need to consider the likelihood that pension accumulations will ac- 
tually follow the paths for which examples are presented. It is a likely conjec- 
ture that, in the past, very few individuals accumulated enough pension assets 
to be very concerned about encountering the Shoven-Wise penalties. But the 
private pension system is evolving, and the paper’s projections may be reason- 
able for some group of  individuals. But then we must ask whether we believe 
that current estate tax and excise tax rules will not change. 
Presumably, virtually no one now would be subject to excise tax. Similarly, 
at present,  only a couple of percent of estates are subject to tax. This is not 
surprising, with the $600,000 exemption, which effectively becomes $1.2 mil- 
lion for a married couple. With real growth, even the indexed excise tax thresh- 
old will not be enough, and the nominal estate tax threshold looms as even 
more significant. But it seems implausible that these penalties will remain as 
they are if they catch an ever increasing share of the population over time. The 
issue, then,  is how one should define “current policy.”  Current policy  may, 
implicitly, be one that adjusts these thresholds to keep a certain share of  the 
population subject to them, in the way that social security benefits and income 
tax brackets were “indexed” before being indexed explicitly by law. While the 
current excise tax moratorium may have more to do with the shifting of revenue 
into the “budget window,” it does suggest legislative flexibility. The same is 
illustrated for the estate tax by  currently pending legislation that would raise 
the exemption level over time. 
Is this just a question of semantics? No, because what is ultimately relevant 
for current saving is what people believe will happen. I do not think very many 
people need to worry about these tax rates. Of course, such insouciance may 
be rational in part because Shoven and Wise have written this paper. 